The Great Depression ushered in a long era of deglobalization that lasted for many decades. An old conventional wisdom (e.g. Polanyi) argues that the common aspect of this shock across all countries, a deep depression, can explain the large and persistent global shift away from orthodox liberal economic policies-including, for example, the collapse of free trade. Yet there is substantial unexplored variation, since not all countries experienced the same depth of shock in the 1930s. Hence, if the "policy path dependence" argument is correct, we should be able to detect it using this variation. Those countries with deeper slumps ought to have seen policy shifts that were larger and more persistent. A fuller economic history of the reglobalization of the postwar period should confront this question, and we present some preliminary evidence for the path dependence hypothesis.
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The decade of the 1970s sits on a delicate cusp: receding from conversations on the contemporary world, detaching from pressing policy debates, and sliding imperceptibly into the arena of historical scholarship. A tumultuous time in many respects, the era that began circa 1970 appears to offer the richest seams for students of social history, geopolitics, and culture; but in this paper I argue that in the sphere of economic history the 1970s may yet emerge as one of the most important turning points of the modern era.
Twenty years ago, when some of the contributors to this volume were beginning graduate school, new research on the economic history of the Great Depression, which is now indisputably a part of the standard syllabus, was at the cutting edge. The view that World War I demarcated the endpoint of history had been left behind. The new interwar scholarship has been a vital area of research ever since, and has helped us understand the first great economic turning point of the world economy in the twentieth century: the great deglobalization of the interwar period.
Time has now rolled on, and from where we stand that Great Reversal is surely long over, and it is the postwar process of reglobalization that now looms in the economic historian's rearview mirror. Understanding, documenting, and explaining that process is only just beginning-but as with the scholarship of the Great Depression a generation ago, the postwar period will form the new frontier for researchers. Where that exploration will take us remains to be seen, but I think we can already start to discern some important terrain.
In this paper I sketch how enduring questions about globalization, of both markets and society, can be seen to link the 1970s back in time to the Great Depression.
Moreover, these very same concerns still resonate today in what many are starting to perceive as a moment when globalization, and the consensus behind it, is at risk of reversal yet again.
Economic historians discussing these topics are naturally drawn to an enduring account of the last Great Reversal, and still one of the most controversial and influential theses in the social sciences, Karl Polanyi's study The Great Transformation. 1 I do not discuss, much less endorse, many of the claims of that wide-ranging book-its muchdisputed characterization of the premodern natural state of markets embedded in society, and its plainly incorrect expectation that developed economies operating as social democracies would henceforth be inimical to trade and financial openness. But as a description of the Great Reversal as it happened, the book has much to commend it.
After World War I, policymakers understood that the global economy had been damaged by the suspension of the gold standard, restrictions on trade, and exchange controls. Adverse policies were coincident with, and amplified by, the spillovers from the elevated levels of distrust and belligerence between nations. But everyone fully expected the situation to normalize, albeit after some effort, with a return to something like the largely laissez-faire pre-1914 global economy.
Following the Great Depression (and another war), the political-economy equilibrium shifted dramatically against this vision. As we now know, most countries, once stuck in the Great Reversal, eventually shifted policy gears and liberalized. Some trade-oriented countries liberalized very quickly in the 1970s or before; others oriented inward and clung to protectionist barriers up to the 1990s and beyond. But why were some so quick to liberalize and others much slower? That is the question.
Empirical variation naturally invites closer quantitative scrutiny. On the basis of preliminary evidence-and there is much more work to be done-I will argue that it was here that the Great Depression had its lasting effect, not (pace Polanyi) by preventing countries ever globalizing again, but by conditioning the speed at which they ultimately re-embraced globalization in the postwar period. The destination was the same, but the many routes taken diverged remarkably-and in some respects predictably. Especially among the developing countries-economies outside the advanced core, with a limited role in the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), and no role in the European Union (EU) project-those that suffered more of a downturn in the 1930s were more "reactive" in policymaking afterwards, to use Carlos Díaz Alejandro's term, and they were more inclined to resist globalization the second time around.
If this argument withstands scrutiny it becomes an important link in our historical and institutional narrative, a bridge from the interwar calamity to more recent events, part of the making of the modern world economy. We could then argue that the global capitalist economy was not subject to a "hard reset Trade liberalization may have been slow prior to 1970, but financial liberalization was virtually nonexistent. This was by design, of course, the goal of the Bretton Woods architecture being to make a world safe for international trade, not for international finance. After the 1930s, the latter was seen as destabilizing, and was clearly inimical to the new desire for macroeconomic policy autonomy in a world still wedded to fixed exchange rates. Thus by the 1960s only current account transactions were liberalized (though not rapidly) even as capital account transactions were still outlawed. But it did not take long for investors to find ways round these restrictions, and the porous controls led to larger financial drains, reserve leakage, and currency crises with increasing frequency as the system lurched, with all its contradictions, toward collapse.
After 1970 the reglobalization trend intensified, but this tendency was at first much stronger in the sphere of trade transactions than financial transactions. The 1970s were also an inauspicious moment for globalization in other respects.
An oil shock and global stagflation led many countries into recessions that were deeper than anything seen since the 1930s. Downturns have generally encouraged protectionist sentiments, and not just since the 1930s: Polanyi saw similar mechanisms at work, albeit with less destructive results, in the protectionist backlash during and after the recession of the 1870s, when the free trade treaties worked out in the 1860s by Cobden and others gave way to rising tariffs, especially in Continental Europe.
All that said, some opposing forces were present in the 1970s that could encourage, or at least sustain trade opening. Most notable of these was the absence of the "golden fetters"-fixed exchange rates such as the gold standard system that had amplified previous slumps. But the breakdown of the Bretton Woods system released monetary policy and exchange rates, giving countries other levers to control aggregate demand: as a tool to stimulate expenditure switching towards home goods, a devaluation could be as effective as a tariff, at least in the short run. And indeed, the larger trade flows are, the more powerful that tool becomes.
In addition, in the 1970s the success, actual or potential, of some pro-free trade projects was starting to become apparent. The EEC was attracting new applicants, and the To sum up, where the standard narrative focuses on a representative experience common to many countries-Great Depression then policy reaction-I think we can make further progress by thinking about the extent to which there was a heterogeneous shock in the 1930s. We can then use that variation in the data and subsequent policy responses, to understand why the Great Depression echoed so loudly in some countries that were clinging to inward-looking policies in the 1970s, and reglobalizing slowly, while in other cases reactive policies were more temporary and policy reform pushed ahead more rapidly.
The key problem is to explain policy persistence. If this idea has empirical content, then we can make advances on other fronts. We can cease thinking of the policy choices of the postwar period as purely exogenous random variations, or as simply problematic endogenous responses to economic growth. Instead we can confront and put to further analytical use their origins as historically contingent, or as path-dependent outcomes possessing some regularity. Empirics: Evidence of the Echo?
Given the space available, I will show some preliminary evidence that the depth of the Great Depression did carry over, through the subsequent decades, into policymaking responses in the latter part of the twentieth century. I will also show that this path dependence was more strongly evident in direct measures of policy reform than in measures of participation in the liberalization process under GATT.
More than any other institution GATT was supposed to be the venue for countries to work together and repair the damage to international trade wrought by the interwar crisis. Thus, one might think, one useful measure of policy persistence, of attitudes towards a return to free trade, might be gleaned from the point in time when countries actually signed up to GATT. For example, as I noted earlier, few developing countries were involved in the early GATT rounds, but by the time of the Tokyo and, especially, Uruguay rounds, dozens had signed up.
Can we detect any impact of Great Depression experiences in this process? Did the countries that were hurt most by the Great Depression spend a longer period of time on the sidelines outside of GATT, thus manifesting their greater reaction against orthodoxy and resistance to open trade? The answer is no, but this is by no means damaging to my hypothesis.
As In the latter countries, the shocks were mild to nonexistent, and comparatively little change in economic thinking ensued. The economic future envisaged by Polanyi came to pass, but it emerged in some places more strongly than in others.
It is desirable, and I argue feasible, to move beyond those broad brushstrokes and examine the links between these key transitions in economic history more closely.
Clearly more analysis remains to be done to expand the sample, examine other indicators and mechanisms, and ascertain the robustness of the correlations. Nonetheless, there is suggestive evidence here that the institutional memory of the 1930s crisis was a factor that influenced policy for a long time to come, including the speed at which countries embraced the opportunities of reglobalization in the 1970s.
Lessons for Today
The Great Transformation was not an "end of history" moment, and the subsequent fifty years witnessed something of a reglobalization along classical liberal lines that Polanyi could not envisage. The new globalization differed from its laissez-faire predecessor, and its foundations were built on international and domestic institutions that supported an "embedded liberalism" with more social protection. Nonetheless, by the 1990s it could be argued that the acceleration of globalization had eroded or disembedded much of that protection.
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As a generality, the idea that the Great Depression was a watershed moment that echoed throughout the rest of the twentieth century is an ingrained element of conventional wisdom. It is most often viewed in this light as a story of what happened within countries, to explain the timing of reactions against laissez faire and in favor of more state intervention. In many scholarly as well as popular accounts, these great long swings in economic ideology and policy outcomes and their similarities around the globe tend to take center stage.
These grand narratives implicitly emphasize the "common shock" of the Great
Depression and the policy response worldwide. In this paper I have sought to argue that this view is incomplete, and that we can better understand the legacy of this defining moment by using the approaches of new comparative economic history to see how the differences in experiences across countries led to a variety of path-dependent outcomes evolving over time. Certainly, using the depth of the slump in the 1930s is a crude indicator, and one-dimensional at that. It is a first step only, and further, deeper research will be needed to validate the argument and flesh out the linkages; but the payoffs to this scholarship could deliver important lessons for research and policymaking. reason to put extra weight on safeguarding the world economy against a deep slump, if such a meltdown would shift the political economy equilibrium past some threshold, and unleash even stronger isolationist pressures than already exist.
To sum up, in terms of global economic history, the 1970s can be seen as a bookend decade matched with the decade of the 1930s. The 1930s marked an end of globalization, which, although some expected it to be a permanent shift, kept trade flows in abeyance for only a few decades. The 1970s saw a widening embrace of trade liberalization that set the world on course for reglobalization. It is a process that still continues for now, but if we want to understand better the possible risks of another reversal, we might profitably invest more attention in the historical dynamics of the last one.
Figure 1 Trade Liberalization 1970-2000
To present a proxy for trade liberalization across many countries and years, this figure shows average levels of trade taxes as a percentage of exports plus imports for the full sample of countries in the Economic Freedom in the World 2005 dataset. Also shown are average levels for advanced and developing countries. 
